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I.

Introduction

Beginning in the early 2000s, pay-for-performance compensation
models started garnering more attention as more individuals expressed
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dissatisfaction with the fee-for-service model then in place.1 At the same
time that pay-for-performance models began gaining traction in the
health care industry, they were also being implemented in the corporate
sector.2
Though researchers studying pay-for-performance models in the
health care industry have focused mainly on the efficacy of these
programs, a slew of scandalous headlines in the corporate sector have
clued us into the inherent flaws present in the pay-for-performance
compensation model. In September 2016, Wells Fargo employees, in
response to an incentive compensation structure, opened millions of new
customer accounts without permission.3 Wells Fargo has since
eliminated the performance goals that inspired the scandal.4 Incentive
compensation schemes, like pay-for-performance, have also been
identified as a root cause of the 2008 credit crisis and the UBS tax fraud
scandal.5 But, these ill-effects have not been relegated to the corporate
sector. In 2013, thirty-five school district employees in Atlanta were
indicted based on accusations that they conspired to cheat on state
standardized tests.6 Teachers and administrators allegedly inflated
scores to meet performance metrics and to receive financial rewards tied
to meeting those goals.7
These scandals, and others like them, point to an inherent flaw
present in all pay-for-performance models: though pay-for-performance
models are often ineffective in achieving their stated goals, they are
very effective motivators of undesirable and unethical behaviors.8
Reviewing the unintended effects of pay-for-performance compensation
1.

Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Uncertainties of Pay-for-Performance, N. Y.
TIMES (Oct. 8, 2010), https://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/08
/the-uncertainties-of-pay-for-performance/.

2.

Lynn A. Stout, Killing Conscience: The Unintended Behavioral
Consequences of “Pay For Performance,” 39 IOWA J. CORP. L. 525, 532
(2014).

3.

Wells Fargo Changes Employees’ Pay Structure, Incentive Plan, THE
WASH. POST (Jan. 10, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/
economy/2017/01/10/277e00ee-d751-11e6-9a36-1d296534b31e
_story.html?utm_term=.152047689c92.

4.

Id.

5.

Stout, supra note 2, at 526-27.

6.

Molly Bloom, Why Atlanta Schools are Trying Performance Pay Again,
THE ATLANTA J.-CONSORTIUM (Oct. 19, 2014), http://www.myajc.com
/news/local-education/why-atlanta-schools-are-trying-performance-payagain/jTZ6aOeJ0msp6FLME6CrJN/.

7.

Id.

8.

Roomy Khan, There’s a Problem with ‘Pay for Performance,’ BUSINESS
INSIDER (Oct. 12, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/theres-aproblem-with-pay-for-performance-2016-10.
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models is particularly timely because the Medicare Access and CHIP
Reauthorization Act of 2015 (“MACRA”) switched Medicare providers
to a pay-for-performance compensation model in 2017.9 If this pay-forperformance compensation model in the health care sector leads to the
same unintended and unethical behaviors that have occurred in the
corporate and education industries, it would be wise to adopt counterincentives aimed at re-enforcing professional values and behaviors. This
Note proposes counter-incentives that should provide an effective
safeguard against what appears to be the most common negative
behaviors associated with pay-for-performance models.
Part II of this Note begins with an overview of MACRA. This
section will explain MACRA’s key features and identify those attributes
that make it vulnerable to the same types of unintended behaviors that
have plagued pay-for-performance models in other industries. Part III
begins with an examination of the unintended consequences associated
with pay-for-performance in non-health care industries. This section
will also discuss the research on unintended consequences present in
non-MACRA health care pay-for-performance models, and ultimately
makes the argument that the small negative consequences observed in
the health care sector are symptoms of a systemic disease in pay-forperformance generally. Part IV identifies physician disclosure standards
as an area of law where counter-incentives could be particularly
effective in safeguarding against these negative behaviors. This section
provides a brief history of the evolution of physician disclosure
standards in malpractice law, before suggesting that all courts and
states adopt a reasonable patient standard designed to incentivize
patient-centered care and patient autonomy—even in the face of
countervailing financial incentives.

II. Understanding MACRA’s Key Features and
Vulnerabilities
A.

Design Elements Common to All Health Care Pay-for-Performance
Models

In order to better understand MACRA’s incentives and structures,
it is helpful to first understand the design elements present in most
health care pay-for-performance compensation models (“P4P”). Payfor-performance compensation models in health care aim at “improving

9.

Frequently Asked Questions: Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization
Act of 2015 (MACRA), AM. ACAD. OF FAM. PHYSICIANS (last updated
Dec. 2016), http://www.aafp.org/practice-management/payment/med
icare-payment/faq.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2017).
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the quality, efficiency, and overall value of health care.”10 In theory,
they accomplish these goals by providing health care providers with
financial incentives for carrying out quality improvement activities and
achieving more beneficial outcomes for patients.11 Because P4P
programs alter the way in which health care providers are paid, they
are primarily payment programs as opposed to quality improvement
programs.12 Though there have been many P4P experiments in health
care,13 all of them have the same three central design elements: 1)
performance measurement, 2) incentives, and 3) transparency and
consumer engagement.14
Performance measures used in P4P programs in the health care
world fall into three distinct categories: 1) structure, 2) process, and 3)
outcome.15 Structural measures focus on a health care provider’s
capacity, systems, and overarching processes.16 Process measures
indicate the steps that a provider takes to maintain or improve the
health of patients.17 And, outcome measures reflect the overall effect of
the service rendered on the health status of patients.18 In other words,
structural measures describe what a particular health care practice
looks like, process measures describe what the provider actually does
during a patient consultation, and outcome measures describe what
happens to the patient after an encounter with the provider. P4P
programs usually use a combination of structural, process, and outcome
performance measures.19
The incentives associated with a P4P program can be either positive
or negative.20 Positive financial incentives can take a variety of forms,
10.

Health Policy Briefs: Pay-for-Performance, HEALTH AFFAIRS (Oct. 11,
2012),
http://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief.php?brie
f_id=78.

11.

Id.

12.

See id.

13.

Id.

14.

Pay for Performance—Models, HEALTH CARE INCENTIVES IMPROVEMENT
INSTITUTE, http://www.hci3.org/thought-leadership/why-incentives-ma
tter/pay-performance/pay-performance-models (last visited Nov. 4,
2017).

15.

Id.

16.

Types of Quality Measures, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY
(Feb. 2015), https://www.ahrq.gov/professionals/quality-patient-safety/
talkingquality/create/types.html.

17.

Id.

18.

Id.

19.

See Pay for Performance—Models, supra note 14.

20.

Id.
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but always involve the award of additional funds as a result of provider
compliance with performance measures.21 Negative financial incentives,
however, result in a loss of income due to the provider’s failure to
achieve the performance objectives.22 While positive financial incentives
appear more common generally, Medicare demonstrations that
experimented with P4P often included negative financial incentives as
well.23
Lastly, P4P programs also, through transparency and consumer
engagement activities, try to incentivize patients to choose high-quality
providers.24 Transparency and consumer engagement efforts focus on
presenting cost and quality evidence to patients in an easy-tounderstand manner so that patients will switch from low-quality
providers to high-quality providers.25
B.

MACRA’s P4P Design Elements

MACRA institutionalizes P4P concepts on a nationwide scale by
requiring Medicare-eligible providers who meet certain criteria26 to
participate in the Merit-Based Payment Incentive System (“MIPS”).27
In doing so, MACRA utilizes all three of the major components of P4P
programs—performance measurement, incentives, and consumer
engagement and transparency.28

21.

Id.; Courtney Baird, Top Healthcare Stories for 2016: Pay-forPerformance, COMM. FOR ECON. DEV. (Mar. 8, 2016), https://www.ced.
org/blog/entry/top-healthcare-stories-for-2016-pay-for-performance.

22.

See Aaron E. Carroll, The Problem with ‘Pay for Performance’ in
Medicine, N. Y. TIMES (Jul. 28, 2014), https://www.nytimes.co
m/2014/07/29/upshot/the-problem-with-pay-for-performance-inmedicine.html?_r=0; Top Healthcare Stories, supra note 21.

23.

See Carroll, supra note 22.

24.

Pay for Performance—Models, supra note 14.

25.

Id.

26.

See Quality Payment Program, CMS https://qpp.cms.gov/ (last visited
Jan. 24, 2017) [hereinafter Quality Payment Program](stating physicians
who bill Medicare more than $30,000 per year and who provide care for
more than 100 Medicare patients a year are in the Program); see also
MIPS Overview, QUALITY PAYMENT PROGRAM, https://qpp.cms.gov/l
earn/qpp (last visited Jan. 24, 2017)[hereinafter MIPS Overview].

27.

See Quality Payment Program, supra note 26; see also, MIPS Overview,
supra note 26.

28.

See John Santilli & F. Randy Vogenberg, Healthcare Decision-Making
and Stakeholder Roles in the New Marketplace, 8 AM. HEALTH & DRUG
BENEFITS 15, 16-17 (2015); see also Pay for Performance—Models,
HEALTH CARE INCENTIVES IMPROVEMENT INST. (last visited Nov. 4, 2017),
http://www.hci3.org/thought-leadership/why-incentives-matter/payperformance/pay-performance-models.
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Physicians participating in MIPS are graded on data that they
report to the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services.29 Following
this reporting, providers are assessed a final score that is used to
determine whether the physician receives a positive or negative financial
incentive.30 Under the MIPS framework, providers are graded based on
their performance relative to other providers.31 In addition to relative
grading, MIPS implements a zero-sum financial incentive system where
the total dollar amount of positive financial rewards paid out to highquality providers cannot exceed the total dollar amount subtracted
from the income of low-quality providers.32 It is also possible that a
provider’s compensation will not be altered by his MIPS score if that
provider achieves an absolutely average score.33
The MIPS framework implemented by MACRA also relies on
consumer engagement and transparency efforts to incentivize provider
performance and improve overall health care quality.34 Providers are
assigned quality ratings that correspond to their final scores, and these
quality ratings are published to the general public.35 MIPS, then, is a
comprehensive P4P program that rewards and penalizes providers both
financially and in the public eye based on adherence to pre-determined
performance measures.
C.

Examining MACRA’s Potential Vulnerabilities to Unintended
Consequences

Though performance measures are a necessary component of all
P4P compensation models, quality measures or clinical guidelines used
as performance measures are particularly vulnerable to unintended

29.

See How to Report Quality Measures for MIPS in 2017, AM. ACAD. OF
PHYSICAL MED. & REHAB. (Dec. 2016), https://www.aapmr.org/docs
/defaultsource/qualitypractice/mips_2017qualitymeasures_1212b74c36b
bb7f361518d86ff0000187796.pdf?sfvrsn=0.

30.

See 42 C.F.R. § 414.1405 (2016).

31.

Charles Saunders, Optimizing Financial Performance Under Value-Based
Care, HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT. ASS’N (Oct. 2, 2017), http://www.h
fma.org/Leadership/Archives/2017/October/Optimizing_Financial_Per
formance_Under_Value-Based_Care/.

32.

See 42 C.F.R. § 414.1405 (2016).

33.

Id.

34.

See 42 C.F.R. § 414.1335 (2016); Quality Payment Program, 10 FAQs
about the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System (MIPS), SAIGNITE (Oct.
2016), http://www.saignite.com/resources/faq-about-merit-based-incenti
ve-payment-mips [hereinafter Saignite].

35.

Saignite, supra note 34.
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consequences.36 An examination of some of MACRA’s quality measures
demonstrates their potential pitfalls. Though the quality measures are
usually supported by clinical evidence, these guidelines are not
infallible, and there are reasonable clinical alternatives that providers,
without MACRA’s incentives, may choose to use instead, were
MACRA not providing them a reward to do otherwise. Pointing out
alternative clinical options to those incentivized by the P4P program
demonstrates one potential ill-effect: that providers will adhere to
guidelines despite the existence of reasonable alternatives that a patient
might prefer.
1.

Influenza Vaccines

Figure 1, below, shows an example of one of the preventive
screening measures used as a performance measure by MIPS. It requires
physicians to report either the percentage of patients six months and
older who received an influenza vaccine during an appointment between
October 1 and March 31, or the percentage of those patients who
reported that they had previously received the influenza vaccine.37

Figure 1: Influenza Immunization. Merit-Based Incentive Payment System, 81 Fed.
Reg. 77,008, 77,686 (Nov. 4, 2016) (to be codified at 42 CFR Parts 414 and 495).

Physicians who choose to report this quality measure38 have an
incentive to ensure that their patients choose to be vaccinated against
the flu. However, many patients choose to forego the flu vaccine each
season for a wide variety of reasons.39 And, despite providing patients
36.

See Louise C. Walter et al., Pitfalls of Converting Practice Guidelines
Into Quality Measures: Lessons Learned from a VA Performance
Measure, 291 J. AM. MED. ASS’N. 2466, 2466 (2004).

37.

Merit-Based Incentive Payment System, 81 Fed. Reg. 77,008, 77,686
(Nov. 4, 2016) (to be codified at 42 CFR Parts 414 and 495).

38.

For the 2017 reporting period, providers must select six quality measures
to submit data on, including at least one outcome measure. See 42 C.F.R.
§ 414.1335 (2016).

39.

See Rae Ellen Bichell, Many Americans Believe They Don’t Need the Flu
Vaccine, NPR (Nov. 27, 2015), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-
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with a number of excellent reasons to be vaccinated, no doctor can force
a patient to be vaccinated if the patient chooses not to be.40
Considering that 38 percent of those polled during the 2015 flu
season indicated that they would not get the influenza vaccine, it stands
to reason that doctors who choose to report this quality metric could
be faced with patients who refuse to comply with their recommendation
that they receive the vaccine.41 While physicians are afforded a choice
as to which measures they report, it is possible that a physician will not
know whether they are treating a particularly non-compliant or
compliant patient population ahead of selecting their quality measures.
And, if a high enough percentage of patients are non-compliant with a
particular physician’s recommendation, that physician could receive
less compensation due to his patient’s choices. This potential outcome
provides a strong incentive for the physician to do whatever he can to
influence his patient’s clinical choices.
2.

High Blood Pressure

Figure 2, below, shows another quality measure adopted as a
performance measure through MACRA. This particular measure
requires physicians to report the percentage of patients eighteen and
older who were screened for high blood pressure annually, and who had
a follow-up plan based on their blood pressure reading documented in
their medical record.42

Figure 2: Preventive Screening for High Blood Pressure. Merit-Based
Incentive Payment System, 81 Fed. Reg. 77,008, 77,618 (Nov. 4, 2016) (to be
codified at 42 CFR Parts 414 and 495).

The U.S. Preventive Task Force, however, does not recommend
that the follow-up take place in a clinical setting;43 instead, its guidelines
shots/2015/11/27/456202280/many-americans-believe-they-dont-needthe-flu-vaccine.
40.

Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hospital, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914)
(overruled on other grounds).

41.

Bichell, supra note 39.

42.

Merit-Based Incentive Payment System, 81 Fed. Reg. 77,008, 77,618
(Nov. 4, 2016) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 414 and 495).

43.

Comments and responses to comments on this measure during the
rulemaking process clearly indicated that CMS believes the follow-up
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recommend that a diagnosis of high blood pressure be confirmed in the
patient’s home through the use of home-testing.44 The quality metric,
however, by requiring physicians to document a follow-up plan in the
patient’s medical record, incentivizes physicians to require in-office
testing and follow-through. Physicians who choose to implement athome testing and follow-ups, as recommended by the U.S. Preventive
Task Force may lack the documentation required to meet the metric.
Additionally, patients are known to be especially non-compliant when
it comes to showing up for follow-up appointments and follow-up
testing.45 Nonetheless, this quality measure incentivizes physicians to
increase in-office follow-ups, despite other experts’ recommendations to
the contrary. Physicians who treat patients that choose not to set
follow-up appointments may see their compensation decline and their
reputation damaged because of their patients’ non-compliance. This
potential outcome encourages physicians to tell patients that follow-ups
must be done in the office, despite the existence of an alternate clinical
method that the patient would probably prefer. This is a small example
of the type of unethical behavior that MACRA, as a pay-forperformance model, incentivizes. But, when aggregated, these small
unethical behaviors, if left unchecked, represent a serious incursion and
disrespect for patient autonomy and the right of patients to participate
in their decisions regarding their care.
The main difficulty with MACRA’s performance measures is that
they tend to measure physician performance based on patient
compliance. While physicians are incentivized to achieve certain
outcomes, patients receive no additional incentive to comply. It is wellestablished that patient outcomes are the best when patients are
effectively involved in the decision-making process.46 Indeed, “patients
who have more knowledge, skill, and confidence in managing their
health, and who are more adept at navigating and using the health care
system” often experience significantly lower health care costs as well as
better health outcomes.47 But, a system that merely supplies physicians
should take place in the office, though the language of the measure does
not explicitly state as much. See id. at 77,208.
44.

See Albert L. Siu, Screening for High Blood Pressure in Adults: U.S.
Preventative Services Task Force Recommendation Statement, 163 ANN.
INTERN. MED. 778, 781 (Nov. 2015) (recommending blood pressure testing
that is outside of a clinical setting).

45.

See Barron H. Lerner, When Patients Don’t Follow Up, N. Y. TIMES (Nov.
13, 2014), http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/11/13/when-patientsdont-follow-up/?_r=0.

46.

Judith H. Hibbard & Jessica Greene, What the Evidence Shows About
Patient Activation: Better Health Outcomes and Care Experiences; Fewer
Data on Costs, 32 HEALTH AFFAIRS 207, 208-09 Page (Feb. 2013).

47.

Id.

411

Health Matrix·Volume 28·Issue 1·2018
Countering Pay-for-Performance’s Unintended Consequences by Rethinking
the Physician’s Duty to Disclose

with a small set of narrow performance measures that they have to
adhere to or suffer a penalty incentivizes physicians to work around
patients instead of with them.48
3.

Sinusitis

Figure 3, below, shows two quality measures related to the
treatment of sinusitis (sinus infections) in adults. The performance
measures incentivize physicians 1) to wait ten days after the onset of
symptoms before prescribing an antibiotic, and 2) to prescribe
Amoxicillin or Augmentin if a patient still has symptoms after ten
days.49

Figure 3: Adult Sinusitis. Merit-Based Incentive Payment System, 81 Fed.
Reg. 77,008, 77,624 (Nov. 4, 2016) (to be codified at 42 CFR Parts 414 and
495).

Patients are often unwilling, or unable to wait ten days before
receiving relief from severe cold and flu symptoms.50 And, clinical
knowledge that antibiotics are unnecessary for treating colds, earaches,
and most sinus infections, does little to dissuade patients from desiring
a quick resolution to their ailment that will allow them to return to
work and their lives sooner.51 The guideline imposing a wait period on
the prescription of antibiotics, if followed, will likely lead to a high
number of unhappy patients who, when filling out patient experience
surveys, may believe they were given low-quality care when, in reality,
48.

Judith H. Hibbard et al., Does Compensating Primary Care Providers to
Produce Higher Quality Make them More or Less Patient Centric?,
72MED. CARE RES. & REV. 481, 491-92 (2015).

49.

Merit-Based Incentive Payment System, 81 Fed. Reg. 77,008, 77,624
(Nov. 4, 2016) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 414 and 495).

50.

Kristine Crane, Do You Really Need that Antibiotic?, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. (Jun. 9, 2014), http://health.usnews.com/health-news/pa
tient-advice/articles/2014/06/09/do-you-really-need-that-antibiotic.

51.

Id.
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they received high-quality care. This is worrisome because it presents a
no-win situation for the provider. If he prescribes antibiotics sooner
than the measure allows in order to meet the patient’s expectation of
clinical care, his pay may be docked for non-compliance. But, if he
adheres to the quality measure, then the patient may give him a
negative review that could also damage his livelihood.
On the other hand, the path is not any easier for physicians who
elect to follow the prescribing guidelines. One study found that 94
percent of patients who believe they are allergic to penicillin (or
amoxicillin, penicillin’s close relative) actually have no allergy to
penicillin, or its cousins, at all.52 But, patients who have gone their
entire lives believing that they are deathly allergic to the drug may be
unwilling to undergo allergy testing or to try a distant relative of the drug
for fear of a severe allergic reaction.53 This measure, then, represents
another clinical situation in which performance measures, for better or
worse, incentivize physicians to work against patient choices and
preferences—a hard road for the physician to travel and another
possible incentive for engaging in unethical behavior.

III. Unintended Consequences Associated with Payfor-Performance Compensation Models
A.

Negative Effects Associated with Non-Health Care Pay-forPerformance Models

Research suggests that individuals who have a pre-existing and
internal motivation to engage in an activity become less motivated
when extrinsic motivators (like financial incentives) are introduced.54
This research is important in the pay-for-performance context because
it indicates that financial incentive schemes designed to encourage highquality work performance are ineffective in producing the desired
behavior outcome, but very effective in producing an undesired
behavioral change.
Researchers studying the effect of P4P compensation models on
employee behavior in the corporate sector have determined that these
52.

Allergic to Penicillin? You’re Probably Not, NBC NEWS (Nov. 7, 2014),
http://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/allergic-penicillin-youreprobably-not-n243161.

53.

Id.

54.

See Edward L. Deci, Richard Koestner & Richard Ryan, A Meta-Analytic
Review of Experiments Examining the Effects of Extrinsic Rewards on
Intrinsic Motivation, 125 PSCHOL. BULL. 627, 653 (1999); Michael D.
Hanus & Jesse Fox, Assessing the Effects of Gamification in the
Classroom: A Longitudinal Study on Intrinsic Motivation, Social
Comparison, Satisfaction, Effort, and Academic Performance, 80
COMPUTERS & EDUC. 152, 159 (2015).
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payment structures increase the intensity of work.55 This increase in
intensity tends to correspond with poor workplace attitudes and a general
feeling of unfairness as employees feel increased pressure to perform at the
same time that they feel inadequately compensated for their efforts.56 These
types of workplace attitudes played out with disastrous results at Wells
Fargo.57 In that setting, “hourly targets, fear of being fired and bonuses
kept employees selling even when the bank started cracking down on
abuses.”58 Despite organizational indicators that employees should
abandon the incentivized behaviors, the misbehaviors continued until
the incentives were actually removed.59
Additionally, psychology studies have found that providing
extrinsic rewards, like financial rewards, had a negative effect on
behavior overall.60 Studies focusing on classroom behavior found that
using extrinsic rewards and incentives decreased students’ levels of
intrinsic motivation, satisfaction, and empowerment that ultimately
resulted in declining test scores.61 The same study suggests that
providing rewards for behaviors that individuals already find valuable
or interesting without the reward, causes individuals to feel controlled,
less satisfied with the activity, and less motivated in general.62 These
findings are important because they suggest that pay-for-performance
models that provide extrinsic financial rewards likely decrease the
employee’s desire to engage in the incentivized conduct on its own
merits. Instead of engaging in the conduct to attain an intrinsic value,
like altruism or interest, the intrinsic value associated with the conduct
falls away leaving only the profit motivation.63 It is this self-interested
profit motivation that, when left unchecked, creates the opportunistic

55.

Chidiebere Ogbonnaya, Kevin Daniels & Karina Nielsen, Does Contingent
Pay Encourage Positive Employee Attitudes and Intensify Work?, 27
HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. J. 94, 109 (2017).

56.

Id.

57.

Khan, supra note 8.

58.

Id. at 2.

59.

Id.; Wells Fargo Changes Employees’ Pay Structure, Incentive Plan, supra
note 3.

60.

See generally Deci et. al., supra note 54.

61.

Hanus, supra note 54, at 159.

62.

Id.

63.

See id.; see also Aaron E. Carroll, The Problem with ‘Pay for
Performance’ in Medicine, N. Y. TIMES (Jul. 28, 2014), https://www.ny
times.com/2014/07/29/upshot/the-problem-with-pay-for-performance-inmedicine.html?_r=0.
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and unethical behavior demonstrated in the Wells Fargo and Atlanta
public school scenarios.64
These behavior modifications, if they occur in health care as a result
of the financial rewards created by physician pay-for-performance
compensation models could have disastrous results for the health of
patients and their autonomy.
B.

Unintended Consequences Associated with Health Care P4P Models

Studies of health care P4P compensation models suggest that these
types of unsavory and unintended behaviors are not only present in the
corporate sector. When physicians receive financial incentives to adhere
to clinical quality measures, they are quickly frustrated by noncompliant patient behaviors, resulting in an increased inclination to
bypass established informed consent procedures, one of the most
important safeguards of patient autonomy.65
A study of Californian and United Kingdom (UK) physicians
participating in a P4P program conducted in 2009 found that the
quality-based payment program had negative effects on the patientphysician relationship.66 In some cases, physicians suggested that noncompliant patients find another provider so that the physician’s score
would not suffer.67 The study confirms that participation in the program
“appeared to increase pressure to cajole and persuade patients to secure
their compliance.”68 Other physicians in the study reported accusing
patients of hurting their ratings and being dishonest with about their
financial interest in patient compliance with a prescribed treatment
plan.69
Additionally, in the same study, in order to meet chlamydia
screening targets, some physicians bypassed informed consent
altogether.70 Instead of informing patients about the screening,
physicians simply requested a urine sample, did not inform patients
why they were requesting a urine sample, and ran the test without the
patient’s permission.71 A physician who admitted to bypassing informed
64.

See Tamara C. Bellifanti, Beyond Economics in Pay for Performance, 41
HOFSTRA L. REV. 91, 134-35 (2014); Stout, supra note 2, at 534.

65.

Hibbard et al., supra note 48, at 483; McDonald et al., Pay for
Performance in Primary Care in England and California: Comparison of
Unintended Consequences, 7 J. HEALTH SERV. RES. & POL. 121, 123-24
(2009).

66.

McDonald et al., supra note 65, at 123.
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Id. at 123.
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Id.
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70.

Id. at 123-24.
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consent in this manner stated that his office originally sent out letters
to patients informing them that they were overdue for the chlamydia
screen.72 But, out of a few hundred letters sent to patients, only about
five patients total responded to the letter and scheduled an
appointment to receive the necessary screening.73 Consequently, the
physician bypassed informed consent procedures in order to shore-up
his own quality rating and the quality-rating of his medical group.74
Though patients suffered no bodily injury as a result of this physician’s
actions, his choices still harmed the patient because he took away the
patient’s opportunity to consent to the diagnostics. The physician’s
actions are particularly dangerous because he knew that his patients
did not want that particular screening. If they did, they could have,
and probably would have, responded to the mailing notifying them that
the test was available.
When a physician has reason to know what the patient wants—
either from the patient directly, or through circumstances of which the
physician is aware—and acts contrary to the patient’s known wishes,
he violates the patient’s right of self-designation and autonomous choice
that was established in Schloendorff v. Soc’y N.Y. Hospital when
Justice Cardozo, laying the groundwork for modern informed consent
malpractice claims, wrote that “[e]very human being of adult years and
sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own
body.”75
A second study conducted in Minnesota found that primary care
physicians, when faced with the implementation of a quality-based
payment program, were least likely to focus their efforts on improving
patient engagement and patient involvement in treatment planning.76
The physicians who participated in the study reported that one of the
factors causing the most frustration was “the fact that patients’ lifestyle
behaviors influenced their salaries.”77 Indeed, 70 percent of the
physicians who participated in the study viewed patient behavior as a
significant obstacle to improving their quality metrics.78 One physician
reported his frustration that “[y]ou can’t make people come in. You
can’t make them eat healthy, stop smoking, take their medication. But
you can be punished as a physician if your numbers don’t look good.”79
72.
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73.

Id.
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See id.
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Additionally, the study found that those physicians who focused on
patient activation and engaging patients in the decision-making process
reported the most frustration with patient behavior.80
A systematic review of the literature surrounding the United
Kingdom’s health care pay-for-performance model found that the
program encouraged physicians to focus inappropriately on those
aspects of patient care that were rewarded.81 The study goes on to note
that this clinical tunnel vision caused quality of care to decline for those
conditions that did not have incentives attached to them.82
Studies of the UK program also indicate that providers are
increasingly experiencing competing agendas.83 The provider has one
agenda created by desire to adhere to performance measures and the
patient has another agenda related to their personal health.84 One
physician described the competing agendas this way: “[a]nd there have
been 1 or 2 occasions where I went through the cholesterol, the
depression, the CHD, and everything else, and ‘Oh, that’s wonderful,
I’m finished now,’ and the patient said ‘Well, what about my foot then?’
‘What foot?’”85 Some of the physicians interviewed also indicated that
they were less willing to give patients what they want and were less
willing to accept a patient’s refusal of recommended treatments.86 While
most doctors indicated that they would not pursue the measures if they
thought they would be bad for the patient, other physicians indicated
that they experienced a tension between doing what was best for the
patient and doing what the indicator required of them.87 Overall, studies
of the UK pay-for-performance compensation model indicate that the
clinician-patient relationship was decidedly altered by the
implementation of the program and that the alterations were not always
positive.88
These studies reveal the tension that providers feel between
adhering to traditional professional values and following performance
80.
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measures associated with financial incentives. Though the health care
industry has yet to experience the kinds of devastating consequences
experienced in other industries, the indicators of additional unethical
behavior are present in health care. For example, Wells Fargo’s incentive
program was based on the idea that employees should be rewarded for
reaching sales targets. 89 On the surface, such a plan appears innocuous.
But, soon one employee casts aside ethical principles and opens an
account without a customer’s permission, and then someone else did
the same thing, and before you know it, employees harmed millions of
consumers with their fraudulent scheme.90
In health care, the building blocks for this type of behavior are
already present. At least one doctor ran hundreds of chlamydia
screenings without patient permission.91 Providers are forgetting that
patients have their own agendas and values associated with health care
services.92 And, as a result, the provider-patient relationship is being
altered in a way that minimizes patient involvement in the care and
decision-making processes.

IV. Physician Disclosure Standards and their Role in
Counter-Balancing P4P’s Unintended Consequences.
A.

Background on Informed Consent

Informed consent, as a legal requirement in all American
jurisdictions, is composed of the following legal duties: physicians must
1) disclose medical and treatment information to patients, and 2) obtain
the patient’s consent before administering treatment.93 Though specific
jurisdictions may impose different requirements, the legal requirement
of informed consent is usually considered to be met so long as physicians
inform patients of “[1)] the nature, purpose, risks and benefits of any
treatment they propose to perform, . . . [ and 2)] any alternative forms
of treatment that may exist for the patients’ conditions.”94
89.

Nick Clements, The Wells Fargo Reminder: Incentives Can Be
Dangerous, FORBES (Sep. 27, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/nick
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Physicians receive extensive training before being licensed to
practice medicine in the United States. Patients rely on their
physician’s medical knowledge in order to make informed decisions
regarding their care. And, informed consent has traditionally been
viewed as a method of protecting patients from abuse by physicians
who act contrary to the patient’s best interests.95 By protecting patient
autonomy and autonomous choice, informed consent allows patients to
safeguard their own well-being and welfare.96 Deriving its roots from
ethical theory and the civil and criminal laws of assault and battery,
informed consent protects the bodily integrity and individual autonomy
of patients.97
A patient’s autonomy is protected when he is given the opportunity
to make educated decisions regarding his health and well-being.98 But,
because it is not possible for every individual to possess, independently,
the specialized medical knowledge required to make informed health
choices, patients must rely on physician expertise when making their
decisions. This reliance allows physicians to remain in control of the
patient-physician relationship, setting its tone, and controlling the
content of consultations.99 As a result, if a physician decides to withhold
information regarding risks, benefits, or alternate therapies, the patient
is unable to make a truly informed decision and his autonomy is
undermined.
Unfortunately, not all patients are comfortable interacting with
doctors and advocating for a particular treatment plan.100 And, giving
patients free-reign to determine their own course of treatments would
undoubtedly lead to higher healthcare costs. But, patients need not be
given the ability to demand whatever treatments they want in order to
support patient autonomy and empowerment. Supporting patient
autonomy does not have to mean sky-rocketing costs, nor does it have
to mean forcing those who are uncomfortable advocating for themselves
(due to lack of knowledge, confidence, etc.) to do so. Instead, it means
ensuring that all patients have the option of making their own informed
decisions regarding their medical care instead of having to accept,
without question, their physician’s recommendations.
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Id. at 20.
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B.

History of Informed Consent as a Legal Doctrine

Informed consent, as a legal doctrine in the United States, has its
roots in the tort theories of assault and battery.101 In 1914, in his opinion
in Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., Justice Cardozo wrote that
“[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to
determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who
performs an operation without his patient’s consent, commits an
assault, for which he is liable in damages.”102 It was not until 1960 that
courts began to look towards the tort theory of negligence as an
alternate foundation for the doctrine of informed consent.103 In one of
the first cases to adopt the theory of negligence, the Kansas Supreme
Court recognized that physicians have a duty to disclose the same
information that a “reasonable medical practitioner would make under
the same circumstances.”104 And, while the court in that case stated
that determining what constituted a suitable disclosure was largely a
question for medical judgment, it also acknowledged that physicians
have a duty to disclose potential risks associated with the physician’s
proposed treatment plan.105
In 1972, the California Supreme Court seized upon the Kansas
Supreme Court’s decision in Natanson, and explained that most courts
treated a failure to secure informed consent to a medical treatment as
a violation of the physician’s professional duty of due care.106 Viewing
a failure to obtain informed consent as the dereliction of a professional
duty fits it squarely within the purview of a negligence theory of tort
liability because it corresponds exactly to the first element of any
negligence claim.107 The negligence theory was applied by courts in
instances where a previously undisclosed potential risk of an
appropriate treatment ultimately occurred.108 The California Supreme
Court held that the battery theory of liability should be reserved for
those instances in which the patient consents to one treatment and
receives a different treatment altogether or instances in which there is
no consent to treatment at all.109 Under this theory of informed consent
101. ARNOLD J. ROSOFF, INFORMED CONSENT: A GUIDE
PROVIDERS, 1 (1981).
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102. Schloendorff, 105 N.E. at 93..
103. See Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 8 (Ca. 1972). See also, Natanson v. Kline,
350 P.2d 1093, 1101 (1960).
104. Natanson, 350 P.2d at 1106.
105. Id.
106. Cobbs, 502 P.2d at 8.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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malpractice, all jurisdictions originally adopted the purely professional
standard of disclosure.110
1.

The Purely Professional Standard of Physician Disclosure

Under the purely professional standard, a physician is only required
to disclose those alternatives to a proposed treatment that are generally
recognized and accepted by reasonably prudent physicians.111 Thus, the
purely professional standard allows the medical community to self-select
the information that must legally be disclosed to a patient regarding
treatment risks, benefits, and alternatives.112 In Culbertson v. Mernitz, for
example, a patient with cervical fibroid tumors underwent surgery for
treatment, but the physician did not inform the patient that the surgery
could cause her cervix to adhere to the wall of her vagina.113 The
undisclosed risk actually occurred and as a result the patient had to
have both ovaries removed.114 The court in Culbertson determined that
the physician’s non-disclosure did not constitute a failure to comply
with the purely professional standard of disclosure because a medical
review panel at the physician’s hospital determined that it was not a
risk usually disclosed by local physicians.115 Though the patient in
Culbertson suffered a serious injury that could have been avoided with
the choice of an alternate treatment method, the patient was not given
enough relevant facts so that she could properly choose one type of
surgery over another. But, because it was not common practice for
physicians to disclose that particular risk before operating, the patient
was unable to recover. This case demonstrates the dangers of the purely
professional standard of disclosure—poor habits by physicians that
undermine informed choice and patient autonomy can legally be
allowed to continue so long as enough physicians have the same poor
habits.
2.

The Reasonable Patient Standard of Physician Disclosure

In the early 1970s, some jurisdictions began to question the wisdom
of the purely professional standard and instead adopted a reasonable
110. Id. at 9; David M. Studdert, et al., Geographic Variation in Informed
Consent Law: Two Standards for Disclosure of Treatment Risks, 4 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 103, 104 (2007).
111. See e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9-6.1(a)(5)(LexisNexis 2017); Culbertson v.
Mernitz, 602 N.E.2d 98, 100 (In. 1992); Cobbs, 502 P.2d at 9; Canterbury
v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
112. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 783; Rosoff, supra note 101, at 34-35.
113. Culbertson, 602 N.E.2d at 99.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 104.
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patient standard of disclosure.116 Based on the notion that “the patient’s
right of self-decision shapes the boundaries of the duty to reveal,” the
court in Canterbury decided that the physician’s communications to the
patient must be determined based on the patient’s need.117 Thus, under
the reasonable patient standard adopted in Canterbury and Cobbs, the
physician has a duty to disclose all of the information that is relevant
to a patient’s meaningful choice regarding treatment.118 A physician,
therefore, has the duty to disclose all information that is material to
the patient’s decision so that the patient can weigh the risks of the
proposed treatment against his or her “subjective fears and hopes.”119
The reasonable patient standard expands physician disclosure
standards substantially. It requires physicians to disclose not only all
the material risks of a recommended invasive treatment, but also the
risks and benefits of not recommended, but reasonable, noninvasive
treatments, diagnostics, and other forms of clinical care.120 Jandre v.
Wis. Injured Patients & Families Comp. Fund provides a clear picture
of the desirability of this standard.
In Jandre, a patient presented to the emergency room with
symptoms that could be either Bell’s palsy or stroke.121 The physician
treating the patient performed a series of diagnostic tests before
diagnosing the patient with Bell’s palsy.122 A few days later, the patient
suffered a stroke that could have been detected at the time of his
emergency room visit had the physician used an alternate diagnostic
tool.123 At the time of the emergency room visit, the physician did not
inform the patient of the existence of an alternate and more reliable
diagnostic tool that could more conclusively rule out the possibility of
a stroke.124 The court held that the physician breached her duty to
disclose when she failed to inform the patient of the existence of an
alternate diagnostic tool because she had reason to know that the
patient would value that information in making decisions about his
clinical care.125
116. Studdert et al., supra note 110, at 104-05.
117. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 786-87.
118. Cobbs, 502 P.2d at 9-10; Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 787.
119. See Cobbs, 502 P.2d at 9-10.
120. See Allen v. Harrison, 374 P.3d 812, 817 (Okla. 2016); see also Jandre v.
Wis. Injured Patients & Families Comp. Fund, 813 N.W.2d 627, 636
(Wisc. 2012).
121. Jandre, 813 N.W.2d at 634.
122. See id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 666.

422

Health Matrix·Volume 28·Issue 1·2018
Countering Pay-for-Performance’s Unintended Consequences by Rethinking
the Physician’s Duty to Disclose
3.

Modern Standard for Physician Disclosure

Though support for the reasonable patient standard initially grew
quickly, only about half of the states have adopted that standard.126
The other half of the states retained the purely professional
standard.127According to one study, in those states that apply the
reasonable patient standard of disclosure, plaintiffs were significantly more
likely to prevail in their informed consent cases.128 The authors of the study
indicate that “cases with very similar clinical facts” are decided differently
depending on the jurisdiction in which the suit is brought.129 While
attorneys are used to the legal variations that exists in different states,
the authors suggest that this kind of geographic variation sends mixed
messages to physicians about their legal obligations and may prevent
the medical community from effectively implementing standardized
disclosure guidelines.130 For example, the Ethics Manual published by
the American College of Physicians follows the purely professional
standard, even though it is undoubtedly used in jurisdictions that apply
the reasonable patient standard.131 This text instructs physicians to
disclose potential alternative treatments to the patients, but it does not
suggest that physicians may have a duty to disclose treatment options
that the physician does not actually recommend.132 Physicians who rely

126. Studdert et al., supra note 110, at 105-06.
127. Id. The authors of the geographical study indicate that Colorado and
Georgia have adopted standards that are not easily categorized as either
a purely professional or reasonable patient standard. D.C. adopted the
reasonable patient standard. Id. at 105.
128. Id. at 103, 120.
129. Id. at 121.
130. Id.
131. See AM. C. OF PHYSICIANS, ACP ETHICS MANUAL (6th ed., 2011),
https://www.acponline.org/clinical-information/ethics-andprofessionalism/acp-ethics-manual-sixth-edition-a-comprehensivemedical-ethics-resource/acp-ethics-manual-sixth-edition#disclosure.
Though the manual notes that any “information that is essential to and
desired by the patient must be disclosed,” the manual does adopt the
purely professional standard because the onus is placed on the patient to
request additional information or to make their specific wishes known to
the physician. For example, the manual states that the “practice of
informed consent rel[ies] on patients to ask questions when they are
uncertain about the information they receive.” This practice is in contrast
to the patient-centered standard which requires physicians to make a
complete and full disclosure based on their patient’s values and places the
onus on the physician to be sure that the patient understood the risks and
benefits of the procedure as well as the availability of any alternative
treatment options. Id.
132. See id.
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on this resource to outline their ethical obligations to their patients may
end up ignoring their legal obligations of disclosure.
C.

Adopting the Reasonable Patient Standard of Disclosure in All
Jurisdictions

In light of the types of unintended behavioral consequences
regularly associated with pay-for-performance compensation models,
and in order to counter-balance MACRA’s probable effects and therefore
preserve patient autonomy, all jurisdictions should adopt the reasonable
patient standard of physician disclosure. Adhering to the purely
professional standard, because of its reliance on professional consensus,
is likely to perpetuate the ill behavioral effects of the pay-forperformance model.
Adopting the reasonable patient standard would require physicians
to disclose all methods of clinical intervention—and their attendant
risks and benefits—that are medically reasonable and appropriate given
the patient’s condition.133 The duty to disclose would not be triggered
only by invasive procedures, but also by noninvasive treatments or
procedures.134 The reasonable patient standard of disclosure, in part
because it is divorced from the norms present within the medical
community, requires physicians to consider patient’s individual
circumstances and values. This emphasis on individual patient
circumstances encourages physicians to think about patients as people
instead of as clinical conditions.135 Evidence from the UK’s pay-forperformance physician compensation program indicates that shortly
after the introduction of a P4P model in health care, physicians are
more likely to focus on checking boxes, prescribing the indicated
medication, and are significantly less likely to spend time counseling
patients.136 Adopting a disclosure standard that requires physicians to
learn what their patients value in order to avoid an increased risk of
liability should effectively counter this kind of unintended effect
associated with P4P programs.
The danger of financially incentivizing physicians to adhere to a
government-issued standard of care is that physicians may be less
inclined to disclose the existence of alternative treatments to patients,
especially given that alternative treatments would no longer be simply
133. Jandre v. Wis. Injured Patients & Families Comp. Fund, 813 N.W.2d
627, 636 (Wisc. 2012).
134. See id.
135. Id. at 818.
136. See Kath Checkland, et al., Biomedicine, Holism, and General Medical
Practice: Responses to the 2004 General Practitioner Contract, 30 SOC.
HEALTH & ILLNESS 788, 800 (2008)(discussing the increased prevalence of
the biomedical model of health at the expense of the holistic model of
health).
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alternative; instead, alternative treatments, were they to be selected,
would represent a clear deviation from the prevalent standard of care.
The MACRA payment scheme means that physicians are
incentivized to adhere to certain treatment standards developed and
implemented by the government. The quality measures, and the
obligation of physicians to adhere to those quality measures, replaces
independent physician judgment. From the administrative perspective,
replacing independent medical judgment with uniform quality
standards can only be a positive—it will standardize the care that
patients receive and it will increase the quality of care received by
patients.
Informed consent and the duty to disclose currently play a strong role
in protecting patient autonomy and encouraging the patient-physician
relationship to be interactive.137 Indeed, informing the patient of
“alternatives to the recommended treatment is crucial to medical
decision making.”138 And, while physicians should inform the patient of
the medical treatment that is medically preferable, a patient may
choose an alternative treatment based on “values, preferences, goals,
and needs.”139 A patient is under no obligation to choose the medically
superior treatment or to agree to any treatment whatsoever.140
Under MACRA, however, physicians run the risk of decreasing
their compensation if the patient elects a non-standard option.
Therefore, physicians have a significant financial incentive to ensure
that all of their patients select the standard treatment option. It stands
to reason, therefore, that physicians have a strong incentive to bypass
informed consent procedures or coerce patients to comply with a specific
treatment option that the patient may have otherwise refused. While
existing medical malpractice laws provide some deterrence to
physicians, if a physician who conducts himself in this way happens to
live in one of the states that still applies the purely professional
standard of physician disclosure, it is unclear that, in the event that
patient suffers an injury, that the patient will be able to prevail in his
medical malpractice suit since the purely professional standard affords
such a high degree of discretion to the medical community in
determining what must legally be disclosed to a patient.
Evidence of the unintended consequences associated with pay-forperformance in other industries is particularly relevant to this point.
Unethical behavior by one individual participating in the P4P program
is likely to cause others to adopt the same behaviors to receive the same

137. See Berg, supra note 93, at 3.
138. Id. at 59.
139. Id.
140. See id.
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rewards.141 This is a particular danger under MACRA’s particular payfor-performance scheme since physicians are graded relative to their
colleagues. If one physician manages to engage in productive and
profitable unethical behavior, there is an increased incentive for other
physicians to do the same to receive a financial reward or avoid being
assessed a financial penalty.
Some might suggest that so long as the quality measures are good,
there is no harm in withholding information from patients or engaging
in other unethical behaviors. But, when these negative behaviors are
aggregated, the cost to patients could be enormous. If all physicians lie
to patients about their treatment options, then soon informed consent may
become an antiquated legal relic. Also, research studies consistently report
that health care outcomes and costs improve when patients are
effectively engaged in the clinical process.142 By encouraging gaming
behaviors that effectively limit the patient’s involvement in the clinical
process, the P4P system may actually be working against its own
objectives of improving quality and reducing costs.
In order to prevent the unintended consequences caused by the
creation of strong financial incentives for physicians to adhere to the
government-mandated standard of care, the physician’s duty to disclose
within the context of informed consent should be strengthened
considerably. As it currently stands, physicians have a general duty to
disclose basic information about any given treatment or procedure, but
the standard is the most lenient when it comes to the physician’s duty
to disclose alternative treatment options to the patient.143
Though the concept of alternatives is extremely important within
the doctrine of informed decision-making, “the requirement that they
be disclosed is sometimes absent in case law and statutes.”144 And,
among jurisdictions, there is little conformity as to what constitutes an
alternative treatment.145 By strengthening the duty to disclose to include
a requirement that physicians disclose all medically-feasible alternative
treatment options to patients, informed consent procedures may provide
141. See Clements, supra note 89.
142. See Hibbard & Greene, supra note 46, at 208-09.
143. See MICHAEL H. COHEN, BEYOND COMPLEMENTARY MEDICINE 44-45
(Univ. of Mich. Press eds., 2000).
144. Berg, supra note 93, at 60.
145. Bryan Murray, Informed Consent: What Must a Physician Disclose to a
Patient?, 14 AM. MED. ASS’N J. OF ETHICS 563, 564 (2012); Nat. Inst. of
Health, Complementary, Alternative, or Integrative Health: What’s in a
Name?, NAT. CTR. FOR COMPLEMENTARY & INTEGRATIVE HEALTH,
https://nccih.nih.gov/health/integrative-health (last updated June 28,
2016); Ken LaMance, Doctor’s Duty to Disclose, LEGALMATCH, https://w
ww.legalmatch.com/law-library/article/doctors-duty-to-disclose.html
(last updated July 28, 2015).
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an important counter-incentive for physicians to respect patient
autonomy.
Though patients are free to consent or not to consent to medical
treatments, there are concerns about the societal costs of a patients’
non-compliance with medical directives. For example, it is often argued
that parents who refuse to vaccinate their children expose society at
large to increased risks of contracting disease.146 But, there is little to
no evidence that P4P programs are actually effective in improving
population health.147 Therefore, implementing these programs and
allowing the unintended consequences to occur unchecked, will
probably not improve public health. But, failing to adopt counterincentives that re-enforce professional values could have a strong
societal cost all on its own.
Expanding the physician’s duty to disclose to remove the
physician’s discretion in choosing what information is relevant to
disclose is necessary in response to the new financial incentives created
by MACRA. Under the FFS payment model, physicians still receive
compensation if patients select an alternative treatment model;
however, under a pay-for-performance compensation model, physicians,
if their patients refuse the government-prescribed treatment, are in
danger of receiving less compensation. Thus, physicians have a strong
incentive to limit disclosure about other treatment options to patients.

V. Conclusion
MACRA called for the adoption of a quality-based payment system
with the dual goals of cutting costs and improving the quality of care
that patients receive from all physicians.148 MACRA, as a pay-forperformance compensation models, assigns physicians financial rewards
or penalties based on their compliance with specific performance
measures. Like all pay-for-performance programs, MACRA will likely
have serious unintended consequences.
In MACRA’s case, physicians have a strong incentive not to
disclose all medically feasible treatment and diagnostic options to their
146. If You Choose Not to Vaccinate Your Child, Understand the Risks and
Responsibilities, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Mar.
2012), https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/hcp/conversations/downloads/notvacc-risks-color-office.pdf.
147. Roland & Campbell, supra note 81, at 1947 (stating the clinical care
probably improved after the introduction of the Quality and Outcomes
framework, but the effects were not compelling).
148. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., CMS-5517-FC, MEDICARE
PROGRAM; MERIT-BASED INCENTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM (MIPS) AND
ALTERNATIVE PAYMENT MODEL (APM) INCENTIVE UNDER THE PHYSICIAN
FEE SCHEDULE, AND CRITERIA FOR PHYSICIAN FOCUSED PAYMENT MODELS
at 4 (2016).
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patients. And, research studies suggest that in addition to failing to
disclose alternatives to patients, physicians may also engage in
fraudulent behaviors in order to achieve performance goals and reap
rewards.149 These results are not surprising given the many public
scandals in the corporate sector as a result of compensation
incentives.150 Given the high probably of these sorts of negative
behaviors, and given that these negative behaviors tend to act in a way
that degrades patient autonomy, counter-incentives aimed at increasing
professional respect for patient autonomy are highly desirable.
Because informed consent evolved as a legal doctrine with an eye
towards protecting patient autonomy, strengthening its standards
should act as an effective safeguard against the anticipated negative
behaviors associated with pay-for-performance systems. To this end, all
jurisdictions should adopt the reasonable patient standard of physician
disclosure.
Though all jurisdictions presently recognize that physicians have a
legal duty to disclose certain information to their patients prior to
initiating treatment, jurisdictions are divided on which standard should
be employed to determine if the physician has actually met his duty to
disclose.
The variation between jurisdictions makes it more difficult to be
certain that all patients are given the opportunity to participate in the
formulation of their own treatment plan. In roughly half of all
jurisdictions, physicians are only required to disclose the information
that a reasonably prudent physician in the same practice area would
disclose.151 Now, if all physicians are incentivized to comply with the
government-issued standard of care, then requiring physicians to
disclose only what a similarly situated reasonably prudent physician
would disclose does not ensure that a patient will hear about the
medically feasible alternatives that lie outside of that standard of care.
In order to ensure that all patients have the opportunity to make
informed decisions regarding their own care, all jurisdictions should
adopt the reasonable patient standard of physician disclosure. The
reasonable patient standard requires physicians to disclose all
information that they have reason to know is material to the patient’s

149. See McDonald, supra note 65, at 123; Hibbard, et al., supra note 48 at
483.
150. See Stout, supra note 2, at 33 (discussing public scandals and suggesting
that it is dangerous for corporate employers to use material incentives to
motivate their employees because it is easier “to meet a performance
metric through unethical or illegal behavior rather than hard work.”).
151. Edward L. Raab, The Parameters of Informed Consent, 102 TRANS. AM.
OPTHALAMOLOGY SOC’Y 225, 226 (Dec. 2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-96.1(a)(5)(LexisNexis 2017).
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decision regarding treatment.152 Jurisdictions that have adopted this
standard require physicians to disclose not just the physician’s
recommended treatment with its attendant risks and benefits, but also
treatment options that the physician would not recommend.153 By
following this standard, patients are afforded a more complete picture
of their health care choices and then are free to choose to accept their
physician’s recommendation or pursue another course of clinical action.
The important point to note is that under the reasonable patient
standard, the choice of clinical treatment is completely the patient’s
own, and the physician-patient relationship serves to educate the
patient so that they can make an informed decision.154

152. Cobbs, 502 P.2d at 9-10; Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 783 (D.C.
Cir. 1972).
153. Allen, 374 P.3d at 817; Jandre, 813 N.W.2d at 636.
154. Allen, 374 P.3d at 818.
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